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CIRCUIT COUNCIL
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
May 5, 1998

In Re: Complaint No. 243
(Chief Judge Carol J. Kenner)

U.S. Bankruptcy Court

To the Judges of the
Circuit Council For the First Circuit

The Honorable Bruce M. Selya
311 Federal Bldg. and Courthouse
Providence, RI 02903

The Honorable Michael Boudin
1515 John W. Mclormack
Post Office Square
90 Devonshire Street
Boston, MA 02109

The Honorable Norman H. Stahl
220 Federal Bldg.
55 Pleasant Street
Concord, MA 03301-3941

The Honorable D. Brock Hornby
156 Federal Street
Portland, Maine 04101

The Honorable Jose Antonio Fuste
CH-133 Federico Degeta
Federal Bldg.
150 Carlos Chardon Ave.
Hato Rey, PR 00918-1757

The Honorable Mark C. Wolf
U.S. P.O and Courthouse
90 Devonshire Street
Boston, MA 02109

The Honorable Ernest C. Torres
216 Federal Bldg. and Courthouse
One Exchange Terrace
Providence, RI 02903-1700

The Honorable Steven J. McAulitte
204 Federal Bldg.
55 Pleasant Street
Concord, NH 03301-3938

Cc:
Vincent Flanagan
Circuit Executive
Office of the Circuit Executive
J.W. McCormack Post Office and Courthouse
Room 1452
Boston, MA 02109

Ms. Susan J. Krueger
Assistant Circuit Executive
Judicial Council of the First Circuit
J.W. McCormick Post Office & Court House
Room 1425
Boston, MA 02109

1. On April 1, 1998, I, Alphonse Mourad, spoke with Assistant Circuit Executive Susan Kruger, who informed me that this Circuit Council was meeting on April 7th to consider my petition to review the denial of the judicial misconduct complaint against U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Carol J. Kenner.

2. I asked Ms. Kruger if I might furnish additional information, and she assured me that if I got my materials to the Circuit Council before the April 7th meeting, that this information would be given to the Council members prior to its disposition of my petition.

3. On April 3, 1998, four days before this Council's meeting, I hand delivered the enclosed April 3, 1998 letter and enclosures, but this April 3, 1998 submission was not given to the Circuit Council, and played no role in this Council's consideration of my petition.

4. On April 8, 1998, the Circuit Council entered its order denying my petition.

5. On April 9, 1998, I spoke with Ms. Kruger, who informed me that my April 3rd submission was not considered by the Council.

6. In light of that disclosure, I prepared and submitted a 5 page Rule 20 Petition asking that my April 3rd submission be considered, and that the Council examined and scrutinize any statement given by Judge Kenner that may well have been perjurious.

7. I felt that this issue of perjury was sufficiently important to warrant a Rule 20 Petition to bring this issue to the Circuit Council's attention.

8. On April 28, 1998, I received an April 27, 1998 letter by Circuit Executive Vincent Flanagan, returning my docketed Rule 20 Petition and telling me, in effect, that the Circuit Council did not care enough to consider the perjury misconduct raised in the Rule 20 Petition, or to adhere to Susan Kruger's statement that my April 3rd submission would be considered.

9. I understand that the Council may not like to deal with pro se complaints of judicial misconduct brought by victim of a judge's biased and misguided rulings. But not to consider my timely submissions, when I was told they would be considered, and then to have my Rule 20 Petition returned to me is the kind of judicial washing of its hands when the Council is charged with the cleansing of dirty, unethical hands of judges.

10. I demand that I, as a citizen of this country, have my compliant and petition properly considered and disposed of and not thrown back to me. That is no way to deal with citizens bringing legitimate issues to the Circuit Council's attention.

11. I also ask that this Council investigate the circumstances surrounding Vincent Flanagan's returning of my docketed petition, without first being ruled upon by the Council.

12. The irreversible damage that has taken place as a result of the devious and racist actions of Judge Kenner towards Arabic people has left many individuals, including my self and my family members, with nothing but heartache, worry, and financial ruin. I have lost 15 years of investment, assets and hard work. My assets and livelihood were completely and intentionally stripped from me by Judge Kenner.

13. By using the Courts, Federal Agencies, and the media, I am making it my life's mission to bring proper justice to Judge Kenner and to anyone who covers up for her actions. I truly hope that you are also interested in the pursuit of truth and justice as well.

Alphonse Mourad
125 West Street
Hyde Park, MA 02136

OFFICE OF THE CIRCUIT
EXECUTIVE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
J.W, McCORMACK POST OFFICE AND COURTHOUSE BOSTON. MASSACHUSETTS 02109

ROOM 1425 617-223-W3

April 27. 1998
Alphonse Mourad
125 west street MA 02136

Re: Complaint No. 243 ",
Mourad:
I am returning to you the document you submitted on April 21st, entitled Alphonse s Rule 20 Petition. As I have indicated to you previously, you have exhausted your f recourse in the judicial misconduct complaint process. Rule 20 of the Rules of the
*cuit Governing Complaints of Judicial Misconduct or Disability enables the Chief
* other member of the Judicial Council to consider information which has come to his ttention through a means other than the formal misconduct process. It is not intended ins for a complainant to bring additional information before the Council.
Sincerely,
Circuit Executive

CIRCUIT COUNCIL
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

April 21, 1998

To the Chief Justice of the Circuit
Council For the First Circuit

In Re Complaint No. 243
(Carol J. Kenner, Chief Judge,
U.S. Bankruptcy Court)

ALPHONSE MOURAD'S RULE 20 PETITION

On April 8, 1998, this Circuit Council dismissed my petition for review of the denial of my complaint of judicial misconduct against Chief Bankruptcy Judge, Carol J. Kenner. Exactly one year earlier, on April 8, 1997, I filed a five page complaint against Judge Kenner.
Between the time I submitted my April 8, 1997 Complaint and up through Chief Judge Torruella's November 3, 19997 Order, I submitted at least 14 documents, specifically:

a. My April 22, 1996 Statement of Issues for Appeal.

b. Adversary Complaint against Mario Nicosia, et-al No. 96-1040.

c. Trustee's May 28, 1996 Objection to Approval of Settlement Stipulation.

d. My Motion For Recusal of Judge Kenner.

e. My Motion For Change of Venue or Reassignment.

f. My Motion For Relief From April 1, 1996 Order Appointing Trustee.

g. My Motion to Correct the Court's April 1, 1996 Findings and Conclusions.

h. A July 8, 1997 letter.

i. My Emergency Motion For Reconsideration of Recusal.

j. An August 7, 1997 Motion to Dismiss.

k. A September 17, 1997 letter.

l. The August 28, 1997 Handwriting Examiner's Report.

m. A September 24, 1997 letter.

n. An October 10, 1997 letter.

On November 3, 1997, Chief Judge Torruella entered his Order dismissing my complaint, but also stating that he would privately communicate with Judge Kenner about the supported assertion of Judge Kenner's poor temperament.
On December 1, 1997, I petitioned for a review of Judge Torruella's November 3, 1997 Order. This petition was based upon a demonstrated conflict of interest between the debtor's (V&M) attorney, Harold Murphy, of Hanify & King, and the Judge Kenner-appointed Chapter 11 Trustee, Stephen Gray.
It was recently discovered that Harold Murphy, who represented my company, V&M Management, Inc., in the chapter 11 bankruptcy case before Judge Kenner, also and simultaneously represented the appointed V&M Trustee Stephen Gray in a separate Rhode Island bankruptcy case, American Shipyard Corporation, Case No. 96-11753. This issue was first raised in an October 31, 1997 filed Joint Motion of Creditors seeking to stay and revoke the September 26, 1997 confirmed Reorganization Plan. That Motion as well as other supporting exhibits were submitted in support of my Petition For Review.
The Circuit Council so treated my December 1, 1997 letter as a Petition For Review. On December 12, 1997, I submitted a bound Joint Creditor's Motion for a Stay filed with the U.S. District Court, Case No. 97-12703-EFH.
That Motion revealed, for the first time, that V&M's attorney, Harold Murphy and Hanify & King also, and simultaneously, represented V&M's Trustee, Stephen Gray in an ongoing Massachusetts bankruptcy case before Judge Kenner, In re Patriot Paper Corporation, Chapter 7, Case No. 93-12482-CJK.
On about December 22 or 23, 1997, I submitted two more Joint Motions by the V&M Creditors as well as Judge Kenner's December 8, 1997 Memorandum of Decision, explaining her denial of the stay.
On April 1, 1998, I spoke with Assistant Susan Kruger and she informed me that the Circuit Council was meeting on April 7, 1998 and that there would be a decision made at that meeting.
I asked her if I could submit further documentation and whether such materials would be submitted to the Council in their consideration of my petition. She advised me that if I could get my papers to her before the 7th, then she would see to it that the Council had my additional documents.
On April 3, 1998, I hand delivered my April 3, 1998 letter, with Exhibits, further demonstrating the conflict between Murphy, Hanify & King and Gray that should have prevented Gray from being appointed V&M's Chapter 11 Trustee in the first place. However, the Council denied my petition on April 8, 1998 without having seen or considered my April 3rd submission.
On April 8, 1998, I called the Council and asked if a decision had been reached. A secretary in the office faxed me a copy of the April 8, 1998 Order. On April 9, 1998, I called and spoke with Ms. Kruger and specifically asked if my April 3rd letter (Exhibit "1") and material were given to the Council. She advised that they had not.
She told me that the Executive Office had recommended that my petition be dismissed, and the Council merely adapted or rubber-stamped that Executive recommendation.
My question is, who is making these decisions on review petition, the Executives, or the Council members themselves?
On April 8, 1998, the Circuit Council denied my petition for review, primarily on the grounds that my complaints related to Judge Kenner's decisions or procedural rulings.
However, in the course of that April 8, 1998 Order, the next to last paragraph, p.2, the Council states that "the bankruptcy Judge indicted that the Judge had no knowledge of such a conflict at the time of the Trustee's appointment."
I believe that if Judge Kenner made such a statement to the Circuit Council in defense of her actions or in responding to my compliant or petition for review, then she committed perjury. And that is why I am filing this Rule 20 petition to bring this new information to the Council's attention, and to ask the Council (not the Executive) to investigate what has to be judicial misconduct of the highest order.
V&M Management, Inc. retained Harold Murphy to represent it in its chapter 11 proceeding because Murphy was a former and popular clerk of the Bankruptcy Court well known to and very friendly with Judge Kenner.
It will be recalled that Judge Kenner allowed Stephen Gray's application to employ Harold Murphy as Gray's chapter 7 attorney in the Patriot Paper case on 5/23/94. On March 20, 1995, Kenner endorsed the enclosed Order for Relief From Stay, which was forwarded to Harold Murphy (Exhibit "2"), and, on April 11, 1996, Kenner endorsed another Order in the Patriot Paper case allowing relief from the stay (Exhibit "3").
This Patriot Paper case, in which Murphy represented Gray, was an ongoing matter in Judge Kenner's courtroom. For Judge Kenner to profess an unawareness that Murphy represented Gray in a case in her very courtroom, and then allow Gray to be appointed V&M's chapter 11 Trustee on April 2, 1996, after a very contested hearing in which Murphy represented the debtor, V&M, opposing the appointment of a Trustee, is, to say the least, hard to believe, and, I don't believe it.
I would ask that this Circuit Council closely scrutinize all written statements submitted by Judge Kenner to this Council in which she claims to be unaware of any conflict, and then to examine her about such statements.
Harold Murphy and Stephen Gray are too big players in the bankruptcy business for Judge Kenner not to remember that they are aligned, and that Murphy represented Gray prior to Judge Kenner's April 2, 1996 approval of the appointment of Gray as V&M's Chapter 11 Trustee.
The irreversible damage that has taken place as a result of the devious collaboration and cover-up between Judge Kenner, Harold Murphy and Stephen Gray has left many individuals with nothing but heartache, worry, and financial ruin. I have lost 15 years of investment, assets and hard work. My assets and livelihood were completely and intentionally stripped from me by Judge Kenner. Five different family households had mortgages taken out on their homes to support V&M Management, and affordable housing in Boston. All of them are now responsible for paying for their homes twice over, for they were all free and clear before this all happened. As a result, my brother had suffered from a severe nervous breakdown when he had lost his home at auction, and was hospitalized. My cousin died of a hear attack at the age of 49 due to the stress of loosing his home as well, filing chapter 13, and having to pay $2,400 a month when his home previously had only a $10,000 mortgage on it. My other brother is now in debt for the amount of almost $700,000 that he is now responsible for and can barely pay through his business. The list goes on and on. Now, I hope you can see how Judge Kenner deliberately destroyed the entire Mourad family.
As I understand, such judge's statements to this Circuit Council are confidential and cannot be disclosed to me or the public. Therefore, I ask and implore this Council to examine those statements for their veracity and believability in light of Judge Kenner's involvement in the Murphy-represented Gray Patriot Paper case.

Alphonse Mourad
125 West Street
Hyde Park, MA 02136

OFFICE OF THE CIRCUIT EXECUTIVE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT

J.W. McCORMACK POST OFFICE AND COURT110USE BOSTON, MASSAC11USE-1TS 02109
VINCENT F. FLANAGAN CIRCUIT EXECUTIVE
ROOM 1425 617-223-9613

April 8, 1998

Mr. Alphonse Mourad
125 West Street
Hyde Park, MA 02136

Re: Complaint No. 243

Dear Mr. Mourad:

As the council members have voted to deny your Petition for Review, your complaint against Chief Judge Kenner is now closed.

Sincerely,
Vincent F. Flanagan
Circuit Executive
VFF:jc enclosure

CIRCUIT COUNCIL FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

IN RE COMPLAINT NO. 243

Before

Selya, Boudin, Stahl, Lynch, Circuit Judges Hornby, Fuste, Wolf, Torres, McAuliffe, District Judges

ORDER Entered: April 8, 1998

Petitioner, a pro se litigant, has filed a petition for review of Chief Judge Torruella's dismissal of his complaint of misconduct filed under 28 U.S.C. § 372(c) against a bankruptcy judge in the First Circuit. Petitioner's original allegations related to a Chapter 11 proceeding on behalf of a company, of which petitioner was president, which managed a low income housing development.
Petitioner alleged that a number of rulings made by the bankruptcy judge, relating to, among other things, the admission or exclusion of certain material evidence and the appointment of a trustee, were motivated by racial bias against the petitioner. The petitioner supported these allegations by stating that several attorneys involved in the matter indicated that the bankruptcy judge is biased against and "dislikes" him. An investigation conducted by the Circuit Executive revealed no evidence of bias. Further, the bankruptcy judge's response to the original complaint and the record itself clearly established that each of the decisions that was allegedly motivated by bias has legal and factual support. These allegations were therefore dismissed as directly related to the merits of a decision or procedural ruling. 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(3)(A)(ii).
Finally, petitioner asserted that the bankruptcy judge demonstrated extremely poor temperament in handling this matter. The Circuit Executive's investigation revealed that there was no evidence that the judge demonstrated temperament which would amount to a violation of 28 U.S.C. § 372(c). The bankruptcy judge maintained that the transcripts of hearings, the judge's orders, and the memoranda of the judge's decisions all illustrate the fact that throughout the proceedings in this matter the judge's temperament has been quite even. The record, on its face, reveals no evidence to the contrary. Because the weight of the evidence did not support them, the allegations relating to poor temperament were
dismissed as frivolous. 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(3)(A)(iii). Nevertheless, as the issue of the judge's temperament was raised and investigated. Chief Judge Torruella indicated in his original order an intent to discuss with the judge the importance of positive judicial temperament.
In the petition for review, the petitioner adds the following new allegations:
1) that the bankruptcy judge improperly approved the appointment of the Chapter 11 Trustee, knowing that the Trustee had a conflict of interest in this case; 2) that the bankruptcy judge improperly allowed debtor's counsel's motion to withdraw and; 3) that the bankruptcy judge improperly denied a motion by various creditors to vacate the order confirming the Joint Plan of Reorganization in this case. Each of the new allegations concerns the substance of a judicial ruling and therefore is dismissed as directly related to the merits of a decision or procedural ruling. 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(3)(A)(ii). Further, petitioner does not substantiate the allegation that the bankruptcy judge was aware of the Trustee's conflict of interest, and the bankruptcy judge indicated that the judge had no knowledge of such a conflict at
"the time of the Trustee's appointment. Therefore, this allegation is also dismissed
'as frivolous. 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(3)(A)(iii).
Petitioner also restates some of the allegations made in his original complaint, but provides no new evidence supporting the allegations. Consequently, Chief Judge Torruella's dismissal of the allegations as directly related to the merits of a decision or procedural ruling 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(3)(A)(ii) and as frivolous 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(3)(A)(iii) is affirmed.
The petition for review is denied.

Vincent Flanagan, Secretary

VINCENT F. FLANAGAN CIRCUIT EXECUTIVE
OFFICE OF THE CIRCUIT EXECUTIVE
JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT

J.W. McCORMACK POST OFFICE AND COURTHOUSE
Room 1425
BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS 02109
(617) 223-9613 Facsimile (617) 223-4990

SUSAN J. KRUEGER ASSISTANT CIRCUIT EXECUTIVE

December 1, 1997

Mr. Alphonse Mourad
125 West Street
Hyde Park, MA 02136

Re: Complaint No. 243

Dear Mr. Mourad:

This is to acknowledge receipt of your petition for review and to inform you that it is now being processed.

Very truly yours
Susan J Krueger

SJK:jc

Alphonse Mourad
125 West Street
Hyde Park, MA 02136
Phone & Fax (617) 364-4010

April 3, 1998
Ms. Susan J. Krueger
Assistant Circuit Executive
Judicial Council of the First Circuit
J.W. McCormick Post Office & Court House
Room 1425
Boston, MA 02109

Re: Complaint No.243, Judge Carol J. Kenner

As I have tried to do in the past, I believe I have demonstrated Chief Bankruptcy Judge Carol J. Kenner's bias against me, and the harm she has caused to many people throughout the duration of this bankruptcy. As you are aware, Stephen S. Gray, the Chapter 11 Trustee approved by Judge Kenner to oversee the operation of V&M Management, Inc., falsely, (and therefore perjuriously), and in violation of Bankruptcy Rule 2007.1, stated, twice, on April 5 & 10, 1996, under oath, that he had no connection to the debtor, V&M Management, Inc., or its counsel, Harold Murphy and Hanify & King, when, in fact, he had a very significant connection, that of having Attorney Harold Murphy and Hanify King, V&M's counsel, represent Gray at the very same time of Gray's appointment in the V&M case. This is an undisputed fact. Gray's April 5 & 10, 1996 sworn Verified Statements are attached as Exhibit "1."
At the time, April 2, 1996, of Judge Kenner's approval of the appointment of Stephen Gray as Trustee for V&M Management, Kenner knew that Harold Murphy represented V&M Management, as there was a daylong hearing on April 1, 1996 in Carol Kenner's Courtroom regarding the appointment of a Trustee. Yet, notwithstanding questionable findings, Kenner approved the appointment of Stephen Gray, the U.S. Trustee's recommended person, when Kenner knew that Murphy, V&M's counsel, represented Gray in an ongoing bankruptcy case in her very courtroom.
Murphy represented Gray in the case of In re Patriot Paper Corporation, Case No.93-12482-CJK-a case assigned to Judge Kenner while Murphy simultaneously represented V&M before Judge Kenner. Murphy had refused my request to appeal the April 2, 1996 appointment of Stephen Gray as Trustee to V&M, leaving V&M without representation. On April 11, 1996, Murphy filed a "Trustee's Statement Respecting Motion For Relief From Automatic Stay" on behalf of Gray in the Patriot Paper case. This was only nine days after Gray had been appointed Trustee for V&M, and still within the allotted time period to file a notice of appeal for V&M (which Murphy declined to do). The April 11, 1996 Statement of Trustee Respecting Motion For Relief From Automatic Stay is attached as Exhibit "2."
Judge Kenner allowed Gray's appointment. She is not free from blame or advance knowledge of the Gray-Murphy connection or conflict, and did nothing about it. Perjury had been committed by Trustee Gray and she (Kenner) deliberately allowed it to take place. On October 31, 1997, nine creditors of V&M filed a motion entitled JOINT EMERGENCY MOTION OF CREDITORS AND PARTIES AT INTEREST FOR AN EMERGENCY STAY, AND FOR RELIEF FROM, AND TO REVOKE THE SEPTEMBER 26, 1997 ORDER CONFIRMING THE REORGANIZATION PLAN, AND TO RETROACTIVELY REMOVE TRUSTEE GRAY, AND TO VACATE THE SEPTEMBER 19, 1997 ORDERS ALLOWING FEES TO GRAY AND TO HANIFY & KING, AND ORDER THOSE FEES RETURNED, FOR THE SERIOUS BREACH, AND UNDISCLOSED CONFLICT OF INTERESTS IN HAVING ATTORNEY HAROLD MURPHY AND HANIFY & KING SIMULTANEOUSLY REPRESENT STEPHEN GRAY IN A RHODE ISLAND BANKRUPTCY WHILE MURPHY WAS STILL COUNSEL TO THE DEBTOR, V&M MANAGEMENT, IN THIS PROCEEDING. In this motion, Judge Kenner was informed about Harold Murphy's simultaneous representation of Stephen Gray in the Rhode Island case. Even though Judge Kenner denied that motion, she knew of the Gray-Murphy connection in the Patriot Paper (MA) case, a fact not know to the creditors or myself at the October 31, 1997 time of the filing of the motion.
In the case of In re Carlton House of Brockton, Inc. & Paula Wyner, case No.'s 93-21122-CJK and 93-21123-CJK, Judge Kenner suspended Attorney Neal E. Satran for failing to disclose adverse interests. Judge Kenner found that "despite his knowledge of these adverse interests Satran had not disclosed them in the affidavit he submitted pursuant to F.R. Banr.P. 2014 (a) in support of the Committee's application for his employment. Rather, he had averred that he was disinterested and that he represented no interest materially adverse to the estate." In the case of V&M Management, Inc., perjury was committed upon the Court to conceal the adverse interest and conflicting relationship between Gray and Murphy. This is far more unethical. Judge Kenner's February 20, 1996 Memorandum of decision is attached as Exhibit "3."
How is it that the Court (Kenner C.J.) allowed this conflict to happen? This conflict and failure to disclose is so fundamental that it tainted the bankruptcy proceeding and represented a fraud upon the Court as to require revocation of the reorganization plan orchestrated by Trustee Gray, under 11 U.S.C. § 1144, and the recusal of Judge Kenner for purposely allowing such a conflict and perjury to occur. Only a "disinterested person" can be appointed or serve as a Trustee, and Stephen S. Gray was not disinterested, 11 U.S.C. §101(14) and §1104, Arkansas Communities Inc. v. Mitchell, 46 B.R. 403 (W.D. Ark. 1983) (Trustee's law firm represented small creditor and another interested party).
Further, these disclosures were not made when Harold Murphy and Hanify & King moved to withdraw their representation of V&M Management, Inc. on October 10, 1997. On that same October 10, 1996 day, a letter critical of Murphy's representation of V&M was hand-delivered to Murphy by Attorney Leonard Krulewich. Judge Kenner allowed Murphy's & Hanify & King's motion to withdraw on the very same October 10, 1996 day- without the requested, or any hearing, and without an opportunity for V&M to be heard on the Motion, oppose same or secure successor counsel.
What Murphy told me at our initial January 1996 consultations, after the January 8, 1996 filing and assignment of the case to Judge Kenner, was that Murphy was a personal friend of Judge Kenner, was a former clerk of the Bankruptcy Court, had personal and frequent phone contact with her, and that hiring him (Murphy) would give V&M an "inside track" or edge.
The irreversible damage that has taken place as a result of the devious collaboration and cover-up between Judge Kenner, Harold Murphy and Stephen Gray has left many individuals with nothing but heartache, worry, and financial ruin. I have lost 15 years of investment, assets and hard work. My assets and livelihood were completely and intentionally stripped from me by Judge Kenner. Five different family households had mortgages taken out on their homes to support V&M Management, and affordable housing in Boston. All of them are now responsible for paying for their homes twice over, for they were all free and clear before this all happened. As a result, my brother had suffered from a severe nervous breakdown when he had lost his home at auction, and was hospitalized. My cousin died of a hear attack at the age of 49 due to the stress of loosing his home as well, filing chapter 13, and having to pay $2,400 a month when his home previously had only a $10,000 mortgage on it. My other brother is now in debt for the amount of almost $700,000 that he is now responsible for and can barely pay through his business. The list goes on and on. Now, I hope you can see how Judge Kenner deliberately destroyed the entire Mourad family.
At the April 1, 1996 hearing on the appointment of a Trustee, the State Department of Revenue (DOR) attorney, Kenneth Gurge, specifically stated to Judge Kenner that the DOR would not deal with me, Alphonse Mourad, and that the three governmental entities behind the motion for the appointment of a Trustee wanted me out of control of the prime Roxbury property that housed the Mandela Apartments. Pages 40-42 of the April 1, 1996 Transcript are attached as Exhibit "4."
By approving the appointment of a trustee, Judge Kenner delivered a political victory to the governmental entities and removed me, a fact already reported in that morning's Boston Globe before the hearing began, see Exhibit "5." That suggests Judge Kenner's decision was a forgone, predetermined, and mind-made-up conclusion before the hearing began.
And, the evidence offered at the April 1, 1996 hearing that I took $923,000 in advances in 1995, relied upon by the Examiner and Judge Kenner, was an absolute falsehood. Trustee Gray's accountant later determined that I only borrowed, not took, $63,831 in funds to live on in 1995. The factual and legal basis for the appointment of the Trustee, as documented in my (already provided) Motion For Relief from the Appointment of the Trustee and in my Motion to Correct the Court's Findings and Conclusions, show that Judge Kenner cared less about rendering a just decision than she did a political, predetermined victory.
Bankruptcy Judge Kenner accomplished or carried out a political victory in bankruptcy court what Attorney Generals James Shannon and Scott Harshbarger and the Boston Edison Company were unable to accomplish in State and Federal Courts, on three occasions.
A September 11, 1990 case, Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. V&M Management, Inc., Suffolk Superior Court No. 90-5433, brought by Attorney General Shannon against V&M, requested a receiver. The case was removed to Federal Court on October 2, 1996, and no receiver was appointed. The case was remanded back to the State Court when the Attorney General removed the federal claims.
In August 1994, Suffolk Superior Court Judge Catherine White denied the Attorney General's (Harshbarger) request for a receiver, and, in January 1994, Federal Judge Wolf denied Boston Edison Company's Motion to place V&M into receivership in a separate action.
At the favor of the government, and without a trial, Judge Kenner delivered the Mandela property to the governmental entities, Attorney General Scott Harshbarger, DOR's Mitchell Adams, Mayor Thomas Menino, and the Boston Redevelopment Authority at the expense of the only Lebanese immigrant to own 276 units of Section 8 housing in the entire state of Massachusetts.
Now Beacon Residential Properties, the largest Jewish developer in the nation, owing $4 billion in assets, has received all of the benefits, the state, city and BRA tax credits, discounted taxes, and money, that I, a Lebanese immigrant, could not obtain. I could not even pay my taxes, as the DOR attorney Gurge stated, "the state would not even take Mourad's money"-- they wanted me out.
If that is not judicially sanctioned racism, I don't know what is.
If you have any questions, feel free to call me at the number above. Thank you for your patience, time and understanding. I truly appreciate it.

Alphonse Mourad

EXHIBIT 1
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

In RE
V & M MANAGEMENT. INC. CHAPTER 11
CASE NO. 96-101233-CJK
Debtor

VERIFIED STATEMENT OF STEPHEN S. GRAY

In accordance with Rule 2007.1 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. I. Stephen S. Gray. hereby verify and state as follows:

1. On April 2,1996. this court entered an Order allowing my appointment as Chapter 11 Trustee of the above Debtor.

2. The undersigned has consulted with the United States Trustee, the Court* appointed examiner, counsel to the Debtor and certain creditors of the above Debtor, and the Debtor and reviewed the Debtor's schedules and statement of affairs and other papers filed in connection with this case. Based upon a review of these papers and discussions with the aforementioned parties, the undersigned does not have any connections with the Debtor, creditors, any party in interest, their respective attorneys, the United States Trustee or any person employed in the Office of the United States Trustee. The undersigned submits and so states that he is a "disinterested person" in this case.
Signed under penattes of perjury this 5th day of Apri 1996.

STEPHEN S. GRAY
The Recovery Group
270 Congress Street
Boston, MA 02210
617/482-4242

EXHIBIT 2
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS (Eastern Division)

In re:
Chapter 11 V & M MANAGEMENT, INC.,
Case NO.; 96-10123-CJK
Debtor.

AMENDED VERIFIED STATEMENT OF STEPHEN S. GRAY
In accordance with Rule 2007.1 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, I, Stephen S. Sray. hereby verify and state as follows:

1. On April 2, 1996, this Court enccsred an order allowing my appointment ae Chapter 11 Trustee of V&M Management, Inc., the Debtor in this chapter 11 case (the "Debtor").

2. I have moved this Court for the entry of an order authorizing the employment of Choate, Hall 6 Stewart ("CH&S") and Paul D. Moore, P.O., of chat finn as my counsel in this matter. I am filing this Amended Verified Statement solely to disclose my connections with Mr. Moore.

3. I have consulted with the United Statej Trustee, counsel to the Debtor, the Examiner appointed by this Court and certain creditors of the Debtor. In addition. I have reviewed the Debtor's schedules and statement o; affairs and certain other papers filed in connection with this case. Based upon my consultations with the aforementioned parties and my review of the papers noted above, to the best of my knowledge, I do not have any connections with the Debtor, its creditors, any other party in interest, their respective attorneys and accountants,
the United State Trustee, or any person employed in the office of the united States Trustee except that:

- Paul D. Moore serves as counsel to me in my capacity as the Chapter 7 Trustee of TLX Communications, Inc. (Case No. 95-15916-JNF) and of C1M Communications, Inc. (Case No. 95-15917-JNF);

- Paul D. Moore serves as counsel to me in my capacity as the Chapter 11 Trustee of William T. Bates d/b/a New England Physical Therapy and Sports Medicine (Case No. 94-13S96-CJK;

- Paul 0. Moore serves as counsel to me in my capacity as the Chapter 7 Trustee of Fidelity Guaranty Mortgage Corparation (Case No. 92-20375-WCH);

- Paul 0. Moore serves as counsel to me in my capacity as the Chapter 7 Trustee of Northeast Building Corporation (Case No. 91-16758-WCH);

and
- Paul D. Moore serves as Debtor's counsel in several matters in which The Recovery Group and roe serve as Turnaround Consultant or as Disbursing Agent.

4. 1 hereby represent that I am a disinterested person as that term is defined in Section 101(14) of the Bankruptcy Code.
Executed this 10 day of April, 1996 under the laws of the United States of America.
Stephen S. Gray
The Recovery Group
270 Congress Street
Boston, MA 02210
(617) 482-4242

EXHIBIT 3
While serving as Chapter 11 Trustee of V&M Management, Inc. Stephen Gray was also appointed as Trustee in the case of In re American Shipyard Corporation (Case No. 11-96-11753), in the Rhode Island Bankruptcy District. Mr. Gray, shortly after his appointment in the Rhode Island case, petitioned that Court to hire Harold Murphy as his attorney. (See Exhibit A, Stephen Gray's Motion). Neither Gray nor Murphy disclosed this employment relationship to the Court in the V&M case. (Illegal conflict of interest, Judge Kenner knew this situation and still aloud the proceeding ).

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

In re Chapter 7Case No. 93-12482-CJK NEPONSET RIVER PAPER COMPANY
f/k/a PATRIOT PAPER CORPORATION,
Debtor.

STATEMENT OF TRUSTEE RESPECTING MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM AUTOMATIC STAY

Now comes Stephen S. Gray, Chapter 7 Trustee of the above-entitled Debtor (the "Trustee"), by his attorneys, and respectfully states that he has no opposition to the Motion For Relief From Automatic Stay Where Recovery Is Limited To Debtor"s Insurance Policy with respect to Frederick E. Sheerer v. Consolidated Rail Corporation. Civil Action No. 95-12682RGS, pending before the U.S. District Court for Massachusetts provided that any recovery is limited to the extent of applicable insurance coverage and no appearance or participation by Trusteed counsel in the matter shall be required.
Respectfully submitted,

Stephen S. Gray,
Chapter 7 Trustee

Certified to be a true and
correct copy of the original. attorneys,
James M. Lynch, Clerk
U.S. Bankruptcy Court
District of.Massachusetts

EXHIBIT 4
United States Bankruptcy Court
District of Massachusetts

In re
PATRIOT PAPER COMPANY,
Debtor
Chapter 7
Case No. 93-12482-CJK

ORDER ON LYDONS' MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM STAY

Patrick Lydon, Eileen Lydon, Julia Lydon, and Patric Lydon, Jr., have moved for relief from the automatic stay to prosecute a personal-injury tort action against the Debtor in order to recover under applicable insurance coverage, not fror the Debtor or its bankruptcy estate. The motion is hereby ALLOWED as follows: the movants are granted relief from the automatic stay to prosecute their claims against the Debtor, 1 only on the conditions set forth in In re Catania, 94 B.R. 25( 253 (Bankr.D.Mase. 1989).
Date: March 20 1995
cc: Robert E. Daidone, Esq., for Movants Daniel C. Cohn, Esq., for Debtor Harold B. Murphy, Esq., for Chapter 7 Trustee

EXHIBIT 5
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

In re
Chapter 11
AMERICAN SHIPYARD CORPORATION
Case No. 11-96-11753
Debtor.
*
AFFIDAVIT OF HAROLD B. MURPHY

IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR EMPLOYMENT AS COUNSEL TO'TRUSTEE AND MOTION FOR ADMISSION PRO HAC VICE
TO THE HONORABLE ARTHUR N. VOTOLATO, BANKRUPTCY JUDGE:
Harold B. Murphy, being duly sworn, deposes and says:

1. I am a shareholder in the law firm of Hanify & King, Professional Corporation, located at One Federal' Street, Boston, MA 02110. I make this Affidavit in pursuant to Section 327 of the Bankruptcy Code and Rule 2014 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy'Procedure .which require that counsel to the Trustee represent, to the best o:f their knowledge, no interest adverse to the estate concerning matters upon which they are to be engaged. I also make this Affidavit in support of my admission pro hac vice.

2. I am generally familiar with the business of my law firm and have made inquiry concerning the facts set forth herein prior to making this Affidavit.

3. To the best of my knowledge, neither I nor my law firm represent any interest adverse to the estate.

4. My law firm and I are disinterested persons within the
meaning of Section 101(13) of the Bankruptcy Code. Susan M. Thurston

5. Any compensation, fee or allowance which may be claimed by me or my law firm will belong wholly to the law firm and will not be divided, shared or pooled, directly or indirectly, with any other person or firm.

6. I am, and have been since 1981, a member in good standing of the bar of the state of Massachusetts. In addition, I am admitted to practice before the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts and the United States Court of Appeals For The First Circuit. Finally, I am a member of the U.S. Panel of Trustees for the District of Massachusetts.

7. There are no disciplinary matters pending against me in any jurisdiction or before any court in which I am, or ever have been, admitted to practice.

8. Neither me or any member of my firm has been admitted to appear pro hac vice before this Court within the last year.
Signed this 12th day of June 1996 under the pains and penalties of perjury.
Attest to
True Copy
Harold B: Murphy

EXHIBIT 6
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS (EASTERN DIVISION)

In re:
V&M MANAGEMENT, INC. Chapter 11
Case No. 96-10123-CJK Debtor

AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID M. UPTON

David M . Lipton, being duly sworn deposes and says:

1. I am an attorney duly admitted to practice law in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. I have an office at 15 Court Square, Suite 425, Boston, MA 02108. My Board o Bar Overseers registration number is 301600.

2. In early September of 1997 I was engaged by Alphonse Mourad to review certau aspects of the proceedings in the above captioned matter and to advise regarding them.

3. I first met Mr. Mourad through an attorney who shares space in my office and wh< had had discussions with certain tenants of the Mandela development, owned by the Debtor, ani through former State Senator William Owens who I have known for many years.

4. On October 23, 1997, the attorney through whom I was first introduced to Mr Mourad, returned to the office after having gone to observe a proceeding in the United State Bankruptcy Court for the District of Rhode Island. The case that he was interested in was the cas of American Shipyard Corporation, Chapter 11, docket number 96-11753 ANV. In discussing the case he reported to me that Stephen Gray of the Recovery Group was the Trustee in Bankruptcy in
the American Shipyard case and that his attorney was Harold Murphy of the Boston law firm of Haniiy & King. I recall asking him how long Mr. Murphy had represented Mr. Gray and he responded that so far as he knew from the outset.

5. I asked him if he knew how long the American Shipyard case had been pending and he replied that he did not know specifically but thought that it had been pending for well over a year.

6. Based upon my familiarity with the above captioned matter and having had some discussions with Mr. Mourad regarding the representation ofV&M by Mr. Murphy, I thought that these facts might be significant. I called Mr. Mourad. told him that I thought that I had some information that he was entitled to have and that I was duty bound to report. I asked him if it were alright with him if I reported the information to him through an email directed to his nephew. Mr. Mourad authorized me to report by email and I did so.

7. I suggested, in the email that he or someone on his behalf should go to the Rhode Island Court to determine the dates when the American Shipyard case was filed, when Mr. Gray sought leave to retain counsel, when that motion was allowed and whether Mr. Murphy was counsel to Mr. Gray during the same time period that he was representing V & M Management.
Signed under the penalties of perjury this 30th day, of October 1997..

David M Lipton
15 Court Square, Suite 425
Boston, MA 02108
617-227-7666

United States Bankrutcy Court
Distrit of Massachusetts

In re

Chapter 11 Case No. 93-21122-CJK
CARLTON HOUSE OF BROCKTON, INC.,

Debtor

In re PAULA WYNER,
Chapter 11 Case No. 93-21122-CJK
Debtor

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON ORDER OF SUSPENSION

Neal E. Satran served as counsel to the official
committee of unsecured creditors in the related Chapter 11 case of Paula Wyner and Carlton House of Brockton, Inc. At an evidentiary hearing on Satran's application for allowanice of
compensation as committee counsel, it came to light that before and during the first days of these cases, he had represented certain parties who held interests adverse to those of the estates and the unsecured creditors. Indeed he had represented them in these very cases. Despite his knowledge of these adverse interests, Satran had not disclosed them in the affidavit he submitted pursuant to F.R.Bankr.P. 2014(a) in support of the Committees' application for his employment. Rather, he had averred that he was disinterested and that he represented no interest materially adverse to the interests of the debtors or their estates. with respect to the matters on which he was to be retained. In view of this evidence, the Court denied the fee application in toto and, pursuant to F.R.Bankr.P. 9011(a),ordered Satran to show cause why he should not be prohibited from practicing law in the Bankruptcy Court for this district for a period of one year. Satran consented to entry of a suspension order, and the Court entered the Agreed Order of Suspension that follows this memorandum. This memorandum sets forth the Court's findings and conclusions in support of the order.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The corporate debtor, Carlton House of Brockton, Inc. ("Carlton House"), operated a hotel, restaurant, and lounge on certain real estate in Brockton, Massachusetts. Paula Wyner was its president and sole shareholder. The real estate on which the Carlton House was operated ("the Carlton House property") was owned by a separate entity, the ASHE Realty Trust, which was a Massachusetts nominee trust. As of the date on which these cases were commenced, Wyner was its sole beneficiary.1

In 1990, Wyner decided to market the Carlton House property for lease or for sale. In December, 1990, Wyner, as Trustee of the ASHE Realty Trust, entered into a lease and option agreement with Stephen T. Foley, as Trustee of the 123 West Realty Trust, another nominee trust. The beneficiaries of the 123 West Realty Trust included Stephen T. Foley, Carmelo Maisano, and two other "minor partners." (Tr: 41)2 Pursuant to the

1 (Until shortly before the filing, Wyner held most but not all of the beneficial interest in the' trust).

2 (Transcript references are to pages in the transcript of the evidentiary hearing on Satran's Application for Allowance of Corooensatic.i and Reimbursement of Expenses, held on January 18, 1996).
agreement, the ASHE Trust leased the Carlton House property to the 123 West Realty Trust for a period of five years, with five one-year options to extend the term, and she also gave Foley an option to purchase the property, exercisable at any time during the term of the lease. It appears that under this and perhaps other related agreements, the 123 West Realty Trust and Foley and Maisano were to take over and carry on the business of the Cariton House. For reasons that are not clear, the 123 West Realty Trust was soon displaced as lessee, and, on July 18, 1991, Wyner entered into a virtually identical agreement with Maisano. However, the relationship between Wyner and the 123 West Realty Trust, Foley, and Maisano soon went bad, resulting in considerable litigation. Wyner recovered control of the property from Maisano, but she and the Cariton House of Brockton, Inc. were soon in financial difficulty, resulting in their filing of petitions under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code on December 16, 1993.

On September 27, 1993, within ninety days before the Debtors filings, the 123 West Realty Trust obtained an attachment in the amount of $1,000,000 on the Cariton House property. Prior to this time, in the early or middle months of 1993, Maisano and Foley met with and hired Attorney Satran, hoping to bring Paula Wyner into an involuntary bankruptcy or receivership proceeding. (Tr: 7, 9, 28, 33, 38) They retained Satran in their capacities as trustee (Foley) and beneficiaries of the 123 West Realty Trust, and as officers and stockholders of an operating company of the trust, known as Carlton House, Inc.3 (Tr: 39-40) They paid Satran a retainer of $10,000, of which they subsequently negotiated a return of $6,000." (Tr: 10, 28) Satran's actual representation of Foley and Maisano continued after the Debtors commenced these cases, at least until January 21, 1994, the day of the first meeting of creditors, when he met with Foley and Maisano prior to the meeting to discuss what it was about.5 (Tr: 29)

On February 17, 1994, the United States Trustee appointed a single committee of unsecured creditors for these two related cases. The committee had three members, including its "chairperson," Progressive Marble Fabrications, Inc., of which Carmelo Maisano was president and representative. The United States Trustee did not permit Foley, as Trustee and representative of the 123 West Realty Trust, to serve on the committee because, by virtue of the trust's attachment, the trust was a secured creditor (even though the Debtors were challenging the validity of its security interest). (Tr: 30)

3--(This entity, Carlton House, Inc., is a different entity from the corporate Debtor, Carlton House of Brockton, Inc. Foley was president and Maisano was treasurer of Carlton House, Inc., and both were stockholders of the corporation. (Tr: 40) The corporation was formed in 1990 as an operating company through which they would carry on, as a new corporation, the business of the Carlton House that they were taking over from Wyner).

4--(Satran returned the $6,000 to Foley and Maisano only after the Debtors filed for bankruptcy protection, probably as late as June, 1994, but the exact date is not clear).

5--(It is not clear whether Satran also attended the 341 meeting. Maisano testified that he did (Tr: 7), but Stephen Foley testified that Satran was not present at the meeting itself. (Tr:
29)

On March 24, 1994, the Committee filed an application to employ Satran and his professional association of Satran, Marino, and Mountzoures as counsel under general- retainer. The Court denied this initial application for failure to comply with Local Rule 31. On April 5, 1994, the Committee filed a renewed application, which the Court allowed on April 19, 1994. The first application was accompanied by a statement by Satran, made expressly under penalty of perjury, that "neither he nor any other member of [Satran, Marino & Mountzoures] represents any interests adverse to the Debtors." In support of the second application, Satran submitted an affidavit. In it, Satran, under oath, stated:

2. I am familiar with the facts set forth herein.
...
4. To the best of my knowledge, after inquiry, the [members of the professional association of Satran, Marino & Mountzoures, P.A} are
"disinterested persons" within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. Sec. 101(13) and do not hold or represent any interest materially adverse to the interest of the Debtor or the estate with respect to the matters on which they are to be retained.
...
6. Pursuant to Rule 2016(b) and 11 U.S.C. S 329, Affiant has received no retainer from the Creditors Committee prior to filing of this affidavit.

Nowhere in the affidavit or in the prior statement did he disclose his representation of Foley and Maisano and their connections to the Debtors, especially via the 123 West Realty Trust's attachment on the Carlton House Property, the principal asset of these estates. Nor did he disclose that he had accepted a $10,000 retainer from Foley and Maisano.

On October 18, 1995, several months after confirmation of the Debtors' plans of reorganization, Satran filed an application in each case for allowance of compensation and reimbursement of expenses as counsel to the committee. He sought $9,665.00 in fees and $40.00 in expenses. Despite the requirement of disclosure set forth in F.R.Bankr.P. 2016(a),' the applications did not disclose that Satran had accepted a retainer from Foley and Maisano for services rendered in connection with these cases. Rather, they recite that "Satran & Marino P.A. received no retainer prior to the filing of the Chapter II."

The application drew objections from the Debtors and from Maisano. In relevant part, the Debtors objected on the basis that counsel to the committee of unsecured creditors should not be compensated for advancing the interests of a secured creditor, Stephen Foley, Trustee of the 123 West Realty Trust. The Debtor pointed out that Satran's time records showed that an inordinate amount of the time for which Satran was seeking compensation had been devoted to conferring with Foley and his counsel. Maisano objected on the basis that Satran had not done many of the things that in his application he claimed to have done. In relevant part, Maisano alleged that although Satran
_________________________
* F.R.Bankr.P. 2016(a) states:

An application for compensation shall include a statement as to what payments have theretofore been made or promised to the applicant for services rendered or to be rendered in any capacity whatsoever in connection with the case,
claimed to have prepared for and attended the Section 341 meeting of creditors, Satran in fact had not attended that meeting.

At the evidentiary hearing on these objections, Maisano clarified his allegation with respect to the first meeting of creditors. He testified that although Satran had prepared for and attended that meeting, he had not done so as counsel to the creditors' committee. Rather, Maisano further testified, before the Debtors filed their petitions in bankruptcy, he and Foley had retained Satran to advise and represent them in dealing with Wyner's insolvency. Maisano further testified that he and Foley were both beneficiaries of the 123 West Realty Trust. Foley corroborated Maisano's testimony. The Court found their testimony entirely credible. Satran offered no testimony of his own or other evidence in defense or rebuttal.

Upon learning that Satran had represented Foley, Maisano, and the 123 West Realty Trust in conjunction with Wyner's insolvency, the Court checked the affidavit that Satran submitted in support of the committee's application to employ him as counsel. The Court found that despite F.R.Bankr.P. 2014(a), Satran had failed to disclose such representation. For his knowing failure to make such disclosure, for his having served as committee counsel despite a basic conflict of interest that clearly disqualified him from doing so, and for other reasons raised by the Debtor and Maisano, the Court denied Satran's application for compensation in its entirety. And for his knowing failure to make the disclosure required by Rule 2014(a), the Court also ordered Satran to show cause why he should not be prohibited from practicing before the Bankruptcy Court fcr the District of Massachusetts for a period of one year. Satran then conceded that he had a committed a serious violation of the rules and consented to entry of a suspension order. The Court entered the Agreed Order of Suspension that follows this memorandum.

DISCUSSION

With the Court's approval, a committee of unsecured creditors in a chapter 11 case may employ an attorney. LI U.S.C. § 1103(a). Committee counsel need not be a disinterested person, as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(14). See 11 U.S.C. § 327(a). However, committee counsel "may not, while employed by such committee, represent any other entity having an adverse interest in connection with the case." 11 U.S.C. § 1103(b). In ruling on a committee's application to employ counsel, the Court must determine whether counsel has an adverse interest under § 1103(b) or some other disqualifying conflict of interest. In order to do so, the Court and other parties in interest must be informed of counsel's connections to the case. To that end, F.R.Bankr.P. 2014(a)," which governs applications for employment of attorneys in bankruptcy cases, provides:

The application shall be accompanied by a verified statement of the person to be employed setting forth the person's connections with the debtor, creditors, any other party in interest, their respective attorneys and accountants, the United States trustee, or any other person employed in the office of the United States trustee.

F.R.Bankr. P. 2014(a). This rule places an affirmative obligation on counsel to disclose his or her various connections with a case.

Satran violated this rule by failing to disclose that he had represented Foley, Maisano, and the 123 West Realty Trust in conjunction with Wyner's insolvency. He would have been obligated to make this disclosure even if his representation of these parties had been discontinued prior to the bankruptcy filings, and even if the claim of the 123 West Realty Trust against these estates had not been secured. That the representation continued postpetition, and especially that the trust was a secured creditor,7 only made the failure more serious.
*
Satran also violated F.R.Bankr.P. 2016(a). That rule required that he disclose in his application for compensation any payments that he had received or been promised for services rendered, in any capacity, in connection with the case. Having received a retainer from Foley and Maisano for services rendered to them in connection with the case. Having received a retainer from Foley and Maisano for services rendered to them in connection with this case--some were even rendered during the case--Satran was obligated to disclose this compensation in his application for compensation.

These failures to disclose were not innocent, a matter of mere negligence or inadvertence. They concerned connections to the case that were not in any sense remote or inconsequential. These were not matters that might easily have slipped Satran's -mind. In fact, with the first application to employ committee...

7-(As a secured creditor, the interests of the trust were in direct opposition to those of the interests of the unsecured creditors whom Satran, as committee counsel, was employed to represent).
counsel having been denied, Satran had two chances to make the required disclosure. The affidavit he submitted with the second application differed significantly from the statement he made in support of the first. Still, despite having given the matter renewed attention, he made no disclosure. Rather, Satran affirmed that he was a disinterested person and that he neither held nor represented any interest materially adverse to the interest of the Debtor or the estate with respect to the matters on which he was to be retained. In view of his having represented a secured creditor and its beneficiaries in this very matter, this was pure falsehood. And I find it was deliberate as well.

Rule 9011(a) states:

The signature of an attorney or a party constitutes a certificate that the attorney or party has read the document; that to the best of the attorney's or party's knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose. ... If a document is signed in violation of this rule, the court on motion or on its own initiative, shall impose on the person who signed it, the represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction.

F.R.Bankr.P. 9011(a). Satran's deliberate nondisclosure of his connections with these cases, his nondisclosure of the compensation he had received from Foley and Maisano, and his affirmative statements--that he was disinterested and that he represented no interest materially adverse to the Debtors and to their estates--were deliberate misrepresentations. As such, they were violations of this rule. They were made for an improper purpose, to conceal a clear conflict of interest that surely would have disqualified him from the position for which he sought employment.

The rule calls for "an appropriate sanction." In this instance, the denial of compensation was not an adequate sanction. The wrong committed was not only that Satran represented the interests of unsecured creditors despite a conflict of interest. More importantly, he also deliberately lied to the Court and to other parties in interest in this case, exhibiting a cold and habitual disregard for the truth. This is not the first time Satran has committed an offense of this nature. See Tri-Cran, Inc., v. Fallen (In re Tri-Cran, Inc.), 98 B.R. 609, 615-624 (Bankr.D.Mass. 1989).

Attorneys are "officers of the court." Id. at 616-617. The term points out that the integrity of the judicial process in any court depends to a large extent on the veracity and integrity of the attorneys who practice before it. Absent the trust those virtues inspire, the system cannot function. The Court cannot ignore the fact that, in the case of Attorney Satran, such trust is now wholly lacking. Therefore, the Court concluded the appropriate sanction would be a temporary suspension from practice before the Bankruptcy Court for this district, as set forth in the order that follows.

Date: Febuary 20 1996

Carol J. Kenner
United States Bankruptcy Judge

cc: Neal E. Satran, Esq., Respondent
Charles Normandin, Esq., for Respondent
Charles Dale, Esq., for Debtor
Eric Bradford, Esq., for United States Trustee

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